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Ideomotor theory states that the formation of anticipatory representations about the per-
ceptual consequences of an action [i.e., action-effect (A-E) binding] provides the functional
basis of voluntary action control. A host of studies have demonstrated that A-E binding
occurs fast and effortlessly, yet little is known about cognitive and affective factors that
influence this learning process. In the present study, we sought to test whether the moti-
vational value of an action modulates the acquisition of A-E associations. To this end, we
linked specific actions with monetary incentives during the acquisition of novel A-E map-
pings. In a subsequent test phase, the degree of binding was assessed by presenting the
former effect stimuli as task-irrelevant response primes in a forced-choice response task,
absent reward. Binding, as indexed by response priming through the former action-effects,
was only found for reward-related A-E mappings. Moreover, the degree to which reward
associations modulated the binding strength was predicted by individuals’ trait sensitivity
to reward.These observations indicate that the association of actions and their immediate
outcomes depends on the motivational value of the action during learning, as well as on
the motivational disposition of the individual. On a larger scale, these findings also high-
light the link between ideomotor theories and reinforcement-learning theories, providing
an interesting perspective for future research on anticipatory regulation of behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The vast majority of actions we perform in everyday life are
directed at producing a particular outcome in the environment.
For instance, we may press a light switch because we want to illu-
minate the room, or boil water because we want to drink a cup of
tea. In doing so, we effortlessly select actions that are appropriate
for achieving a desired outcome. Accordingly, the ability to asso-
ciate actions with their immediate and long-term consequences is
a key mechanism for learning, and thus for flexible and adaptive
control of behavior.
Ideomotor theory (IMT) constitutes the prevailing theoretical
approach toward the role of effect anticipation in action control.
The earliest versions of IMT can be traced back to the nineteenth
century (Lotze, 1852; Harleß, 1861; James, 1890), and these ideas
have undergone a renaissance in experimental psychology over
the last decades (for recent reviews see Nattkemper et al., 2010;
Shin et al., 2010; Pfister and Janczyk, 2012). In a nutshell, the core
assumption of IMT is that actions and their perceptual outcomes
are cognitively bound together. Performing an action (A) that pro-
duces a particular environmental effect (E) is assumed to lead
to the formation of a common representation of the two events
(“A-E binding”). Importantly, these bindings are conceived as bi-
directional. Thus, internally anticipating a desired environmental
effect directly activates the associated motor program, thereby
promoting goal-directed behavior.
In the laboratory, this cardinal assumption of IMT is commonly
assessed with so-called induction paradigms (Elsner and Hommel,
2001). Typically, participants first complete an acquisition phase to
establish a novel association between simple actions and arbitrary
sensory effects. For instance, participants may perform left- and
right-hand button presses, each of which is contingently followed
by a specific stimulus (e.g., left button → low-pitch tone, right
button→ high-pitch tone). In a subsequent test phase, the same
responses are performed in a speeded forced-choice response task
while the learned action-effects are presented as primes. Presup-
posing that participants have acquired bi-directional A-E bindings
in the learning phase, the perception of a learned action-effect
should directly activate the associated response, causing facilita-
tion when the prime was previously the effect of the required
response (compatible primes) and interference when the prime
was previously the effect of a different response (incompatible
primes). Over the last decade, this prediction has been confirmed
in numerous studies employing a variety of response and effect
modalities (e.g., Hommel, 1996; Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Beck-
ers et al., 2002; Ziessler and Nattkemper, 2002; Kunde, 2004;
Ziessler et al., 2004; Herwig et al., 2007).
Interestingly, once A-E knowledge has been acquired, the prim-
ing of a response via the activation of an associated perceptual rep-
resentation seems to occur highly automatically, without requiring
further cognitive mediation. For instance, it also occurs in condi-
tions in which effect primes are entirely task-irrelevant (Hommel,
1996) and even when the primes are presented subliminally so that
they cannot be consciously perceived (Kunde, 2004). On the other
hand, relatively little is known about the factors that contribute
to the acquisition of this kind of knowledge. Elsner and Hommel
(2004) have investigated situational determinants of A-E binding,
demonstrating that it critically depends on the temporal contigu-
ity and the probabilistic contingency between actions and their
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effects. In other words, A-E binding diminishes with increasing
delays between the two events, as well as with reduced predictabil-
ity of a unique effect. Other studies have shown that cognitive
factors such as the internal selection of an action may influence
the strength of A-E binding during the acquisition phase (Ziessler
et al., 2004; Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009; Kühn
et al., 2009; but see Pfister et al., 2011).
Here, we wanted to examine whether the acquisition of A-E
bindings can moreover be modulated by factors related to the
motivational value of an action. It is well established that mone-
tary incentives can be used to modulate a wide range of human
cognitive functions including visual discrimination, conflict reso-
lution, and long-term memory encoding (Wittmann et al., 2005;
Engelmann and Pessoa, 2007; Padmala and Pessoa, 2008; Krebs
et al., 2012). In these paradigms, reward is typically associated with
specific trial types, stimulus types, or entire task blocks, in such a
way that the participant is rewarded for correct and/or fast exe-
cutions of the required response. As such, these stimulus-reward
associations are in most cases compatible with the task goal, which
generally results in a facilitation of response execution. However,
we recently showed that reward associations can also have detri-
mental effects upon response execution if they trigger specific
response tendencies that are incompatible with the task goal (Krebs
et al., 2010, 2011). Another line of research has demonstrated that
not only perceptual but also affective features of outcomes are
bound to the actions that produce them. Specifically, in a study
by Beckers et al. (2002), one of two responses in a free-choice task
was always associated with an electrocutaneous stimulation (neg-
ative valence), while the other was not (positive valence). In the
subsequent test phase, responses to target words were facilitated
if their semantic valence was compatible with the effect previ-
ously associated with this response (Beckers et al., 2002). Similar
effects of “affective compatibility” have been observed in a recent
study by Eder et al. (2012). The authors showed that preparing a
response to a picture of positive or negative valence interfered with
the actual execution of a subsequent response to a word of similar
valence. This suggests that action planning involves the activa-
tion of associated affective features, making them less accessible to
other responses that share this feature.
While these findings highlight that affective codes are a part
of the mental representation of an action, we wanted to further
investigate whether motivational values of an action would mod-
ulate the degree of A-E binding – a notion which has not yet been
tested. To this end, we associated two out of four actions with
monetary incentives during the acquisition phase of an induction
paradigm. In the subsequent test phase, we assessed the influ-
ence of compatible and incompatible effect primes, which could
be related to former reward or to no reward, in the absence of
any further monetary reinforcement. Considering previous evi-
dence that affective feedback stimuli can strengthen sensorimotor
integration (Colzato et al., 2007a; Waszak and Pholulamdeth,
2009), and that reward-related stimuli can prime response ten-
dencies even if they are task-irrelevant (Krebs et al., 2010), we
predicted that binding would be stronger for rewarded A-E map-
pings as compared to unrewarded mappings. This should be
reflected in increased compatibility effects for primes that were
previously related to a rewarded action, and would provide direct
evidence that the acquisition of action-effect knowledge can be
modulated by changes in the motivational value of an action and
its consequence.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
Twenty-six undergraduate students from Ghent University
(eight male, four left-handed) participated in the study (mean
age= 18.72 years; SD= 1.02). They all had normal or corrected to
normal vision, gave written and informed consent to participate,
and were naive to the rationale of the experiment. Stimuli were pre-
sented on a PC with a 17” monitor and responses were given with
both index and middle fingers using the buttons “A,” “S,” “K,” and
“L” on a QWERTY computer keyboard. Following the experiment,
participants completed the Behavioral-Inhibition and Behavioral-
Activation Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver and White, 1994) to assess indi-
vidual sensitivity to reward. The whole procedure lasted approx-
imately 30 min. All participants received a basic compensation of
4 euro and an average performance-related bonus of 2.5 euro.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In line with previous research on A-E binding, the experiment
consisted of two phases. First, participants completed an acquisi-
tion phase to establish learning of novel A-E mappings. For the
given purpose, we manipulated the reward value of these map-
pings by associating half of them with monetary incentives. In
the subsequent test phase, in which participants could no longer
earn bonuses, the degree of A-E binding was assessed by present-
ing the previous action-effects as task-irrelevant response primes.
Based on our assumption that reward would modulate the binding
between actions and their effects during the acquisition phase, we
predicted that reward-related primes would induce greater incom-
patibility effects as compared to reward-unrelated primes in the
test phase.
ACQUISITION PHASE
The acquisition phase consisted of a forced-choice reaction time
(RT) task with four different responses. Within a given block,
each response was consistently mapped onto one specific pic-
ture (response cue) taken from a set of line drawings (Snodgrass
and Vanderwart, 1980). At the beginning of each block, the four
specific response cues were presented on the screen along with
their associated responses. In each trial, after a variable intertrial
interval (ITI) of 800–1000 ms, one of the cues was centrally pre-
sented for the maximum duration of 1500 ms (Figure 1A, left
panel). Immediately after a response was given, or the maximum
duration was reached, a colored square was displayed for 500 ms
in the background of the cue, serving as a visual action-effect
(see Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011 for a similar procedure). In
case of correct responses, the background color was response-
specific (red, green, blue, or yellow), and in case of incorrect or
late responses (>1500 ms) the background square turned gray.
Participants were instructed to respond to the cues as quickly and
as accurately as possible. Furthermore, they were told that the
background color would indicate if their response on a given trial
was correct and within the critical time window. Importantly, the
picture category of the current cue (living animals vs. non-living
objects) indicated whether a correct response (action, A) would
be rewarded (reward action, RA) or not (no-reward action, NA).
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the experimental paradigm in the acquisition
phase (A) and test phase (B). During acquisition, two out of the four actions
were associated with reward (RA vs. NA). The unique effects (E1–E4) that
were produced by specific actions (A1–A4) were used as response primes in
the subsequent test phase. Primes could be either compatible with the
required response (cP) or incompatible (shown for one exemplary A-E
mapping). Due to the reward manipulation during acquisition, incompatible
primes in the test phase could be either related to reward (iRP) or to
no-reward (iNP) effects. The primes, however, were entirely irrelevant to the
task and no longer predictive of reward in the test phase.
For each correct response that was given within the maximum time
window of 1500 ms, 10 points were automatically added to the par-
ticipants’ score, which determined the total gain in Euro cents (0.5
euro per 200 points). The cue-category association with reward
was counterbalanced across participants and cue categories were
equally assigned to both hands and to index and middle fingers. In
each block, a novel set of cue pictures was introduced in order to
keep the task at a constant level of difficulty. However, mappings
between cue categories and responses, and between responses and
effect colors were constant for each participant (counterbalanced
across participants). Overall, participants worked through four
blocks of 60 trials, resulting in 120 reward trials and 120 no-reward
trials performed with two fingers each.
TEST PHASE
In the test phase, participants completed a similar RT task using
the same responses as before. They were told that there was no
longer anything to win, but that they should continue to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible. Importantly, responses were
cued by a new set of pictures that were not associated with
the previous cue categories (abstract symbols from the creative
symbol collection of Matton images1). The new cue-category
1http://www.mattonimages.de/bilder/cd/ingram_publishing/creative_symbol_
collection
was introduced to eliminate a potentially confounding influence
of stimulus-effect associations on task performance in the test
phase (cf. Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). To probe the degree of
A-E binding, the previous action-effects were now presented as
response primes (i.e., displayed as squares in the background at
100 ms prior to cue onset until the offset of the cue). Partici-
pants were instructed that the colors were irrelevant for the task
at hand and should thus be ignored. Analogous to the acquisi-
tion phase, cues remained on the screen for a maximum dura-
tion of 1500 ms. After a response was given or the maximum
duration was reached, performance feedback was presented cen-
trally for 500 ms, with a “+” indicating correct and fast responses
and a “−” indicating response errors or omissions (Figure 1B).
All possible combinations of response cues and primes were
presented equally often, resulting in three types of primes: (1)
compatible primes (cP, compatible to previous A-E mapping),
(2) incompatible reward-related primes (iRP, effect of a differ-
ent previously reward-related response), and (3) incompatible
no-reward primes (iNP, effect of a different previously reward-
unrelated response). Moreover, responses themselves could be
distinguished based on whether they had been related to reward
in the acquisition phase (former RA) or not (former NA). Alto-
gether, participants completed eight trials of each prime response
combination, resulting in a total of 128 trials (32 cP, 48 iRP,
48 iNP).
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RESULTS
ACQUISITION PHASE
As expected, participants’ responses were faster on trials with RA
than on trials with NA (RA<NA; t= 6.58, p< 0.001; Table 1),
confirming that cue-reward associations facilitated performance
in the respective trials. Overall, participants responded highly
accurately with a small numerical but non-significant difference
between reward and no-reward trials (96.8 vs. 95.4%; p> 0.1).
TEST PHASE RESPONSE TIMES (RTs)
Mean RTs of correct responses in the test phase were analyzed
using a 2× 3 repeated-measures analysis of variance (rANOVA)
with reward-relatedness of the action (RA vs. NA) and prime com-
patibility (cP vs. iNP vs. iRP) as within-subject factors (Figure 2A;
Table 1). The assumption of sphericity for the rANOVAs was
tested using Mauchley’s method. Since no significant violations
were observed (all W -values> 0.8, p> 0.2), uncorrected F statis-
tics are reported in the results. There was neither a main effect
of reward-relatedness [F(1,25)= 0.44, p= 0.512,η2p = 0.017] nor
a main effect of prime compatibility [F(2,50)= 1.24, p= 0.298,
η2p = 0.017] alone, but a significant interaction of the two fac-
tors [F(2,50)= 3.58, p= 0.035, η2p = 0.125]. Post hoc t -tests
employed to test the nature of this interaction revealed that for for-
mer NA, RTs were significantly slower when primed with incom-
patible reward-related effects compared to incompatible reward-
unrelated effects [iRP> iNP; t (25)= 2.18, p= 0.031, Cohen’s
d = 0.225], as well as compared to compatible primes [iRP> cP;
t (25)= 3.12, p= 0.005, d = 0.341]. The difference between iNP
and cP was not significant [t (25)= 0.966, p= 0.344; d = 0.122].
By contrast, for former RA, RTs did not differ at all across prime
conditions (all p-values> 0.4).
TEST PHASE ACCURACY
An identical rANOVA on the response accuracy revealed no main
effects of reward-relatedness of the action or prime compatibility,
and no interaction of the two factors (all p-values> 0.1). This
indicates that the conditions did not differ with regard to the
absolute percentages of errors. We conducted an additional analy-
sis of the relative percentages (i.e., ratios) of different error types
across conditions to explore whether the ratio of prime-consistent
errors would be increased in iRP-trials. This would support the
notion that the perception of former reward-related effects indeed
induced a specific, albeit false, action in the test phase (see Schmidt
Table 1 | Behavioral performance in acquisition and test phase.
RT ms (SE) Accuracy% (SE)
Acquisition RA NA RA NA
553.1 (10.0) 608.2 (13.9) 96.8 (0.6) 95.4 (0.7)
Test Former RA Former NA Former RA Former NA
cP 580.6 (14.6) 573.2 (10.6) 96.5 (1.0) 98.3 (0.6)
iNP 575.7 (11.0) 580.0 (10.9) 97.2 (0.6) 96.8 (1.0)
iRP 574.0 (10.9) 593.5 (12.7) 95.6 (1.2) 97.5 (0.6)
RA, reward action; NA, no-reward action; cP, compatible prime; iNP, incompatible
no-reward prime; iRP, incompatible reward prime; SE, standard error of the mean.
and De Houwer, 2011 for a similar analysis of different error
types). To this end, we distinguished between prime-consistent
errors, defined as erroneous responses that were consistent with
the incompatible prime on a given trial, and prime-inconsistent
errors, defined as erroneous responses that were not consistent
with the incompatible prime, i.e., random errors. Observed ratios
for prime-consistent errors were compared with a baseline of
33.3% that would be expected under a random error distribution
with only one out of three possible false responses being prime-
consistent. It should be noted that this analysis is limited in two
ways, and must hence be considered exploratory: first, due to the
nature of the paradigm, only incompatible conditions could be
included, as no prime-consistent errors could be made on compat-
ible trials. Second, the analysis could only be performed on a subset
of participants, i.e., those who committed errors in the respective
conditions (former RA trials: N = 13; former NA trials: N = 11).
Ratios of prime-consistent errors were significantly increased in
only one condition, namely on trials in which former no-reward
responses were primed with incompatible reward-related effects
[iRP: 62 vs. 33.3%, t (10)= 2.3, p= 0.042].
INDIVIDUAL REWARD RESPONSIVENESS
Our final analysis was concerned with the relation of participants’
task performance to inter-individual differences in reward respon-
siveness. If the observed priming effect indeed reflects reward-
driven strengthening of A-E bindings, then the size of this effect
may be related to participants’ dispositional sensitivity to reward-
ing events. To this end, we correlated individual RT-differences
between iRP-trials and iNP-trials with the individual scores on
the reward responsiveness subscale of the BIS/BAS (Carver and
White, 1994), which is thought to reflect an individual’s disposi-
tional responsiveness to rewarding events. In the present sample,
individual reward responsiveness scores varied between 14 and
20 (mean score= 17, SD= 1.74). We observed a significant cor-
relation between RT difference values (NA-iRP minus NA-iNP)
and the reward responsiveness subscale across all 26 partici-
pants [r(24)= 0.42, p= 0.030, two-tailed], indicating that those
participants who reported being more responsive to reward in
general showed a greater slowing on NA-iRP-trials compared to
NA-iNP-trials (Figure 2B).
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the influence of reward on A-E
binding. We hypothesized that the intrinsic tendency to associate
actions with their contingent outcomes could be influenced by
assigning motivational values to specific actions. Following an
acquisition phase in which half of the applied A-E mappings were
related to monetary incentives, the strength of A-E binding was
assessed in a test phase by presenting the former action-effects as
task-irrelevant primes.
Altogether, three major findings were evident, all of which
confirmed our prediction. First, and most importantly, induction
effects were only found for primes that had been associated with
reward during acquisition, providing direct evidence that reward
strengthens the association between actions and their outcomes.
Note that these differential effects occurred although the primes
were entirely irrelevant to the task at hand and they were no longer
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FIGURE 2 | Influence of reward-related primes in the test phase. (A)
Despite being entirely irrelevant to the task and being no longer predictive of
reward, incompatible reward-related primes (iRP) differentially increased RTs
to new cues in the test phase. This effect was unique to former NA
responses, in which the required action was never associated with actual
reward. Error bars depict the standard error of the mean (SE) for
within-subject comparisons. (B) The size of the RT-differences on trials with
incompatible reward-related primes compared to trials with incompatible
reward-unrelated primes (iRP> INP) on former NA trials correlated with
participants dispositional responsiveness to reward.
predictive of any reward, which highlights the automatic nature
of the binding process. Second, besides slower RTs on trials with
correct responses, the same incompatible reward-related primes
also increased the ratio of prime-consistent errors compared to a
random distribution. This finding nicely illustrates the specificity
of the interference effect at the response level and thus directly
mirrors the concept of bi-directional action-effect representations
in the framework of IMT. Third, inter-individual differences in
reward responsiveness predicted the size of differential binding
effects for reward-related and reward-unrelated primes. This find-
ing further supports the idea that the observed induction effect
with reward-related primes is related to incentive value representa-
tions of specific A-E bindings, which likely vary across individuals.
Such a pattern is highly consistent with previously reported cor-
relations between reward-sensitivity traits and actual behavioral
responsiveness to reward (Kambouropoulos and Staiger, 2004),
as well as between reward-related performance facilitation and
neural activity in brain regions implicated in reward processing
(Locke and Braver, 2008).
It is,however, important to consider to what extent the observed
induction effect with reward-related primes indeed reflects a mod-
ulation of A-E binding in the acquisition phase. It could be argued
that the influence of former reward effects arises from prioritized
processing of a salient stimulus. Several possible outcomes are
possible: for instance, stimulus processing could be generally facil-
itated by the salient effect, similar to effects of reward-related colors
in a visual search array (Kiss et al., 2009). Such facilitation should,
however, result in faster rather than slower response execution due
to the advanced access to stimulus information. The salient effect
color could also lead to a general distraction form the main task.
Such effects have been demonstrated by using salient stimuli as
irrelevant flankers in a target-discrimination task (Serences et al.,
2005), as well as for reward-related colors that were presented at
irrelevant positions in a visual search task (Hickey et al., 2010).
Finally, participants could have experienced some kind of frustra-
tion in trials displaying former reward-related effects in the test
phase, as they could no longer earn bonus money. In turn, frustra-
tion could cause unspecific attentional distraction. Importantly,
however, all these forms of attentional distraction are unlikely to
trigger specific erroneous response tendencies, which is suggested
by the result of the exploratory error types analysis in the present
study.
It is moreover key to exclude the possibility that the observed
differential effect in the test phase is an artefact of the individuals’
performance during the acquisition phase. As noted above, there
was no difference in performance accuracy between reward-related
and unrelated trials. Thus, participants experienced a similar num-
ber of A-E couplings in both conditions. Furthermore, participants
responded faster in reward-related trials in the acquisition phase.
This nicely illustrates that participants were indeed motivated by
the prospect of reward and optimized their performance accord-
ingly (Krebs et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2012). It could thus be
argued that the observed binding for reward-related A-E mappings
is a mere consequence of participants allocating more attention
to the reward-related color effects during acquisition. Although
recent evidence indicates that directing the focus of attention
toward action outcomes during the acquisition phase does not
automatically facilitate A-E binding (Herwig and Waszak, 2009),
future research should certainly specify the mechanisms by which
reward modulates A-E binding and to what extent it relies on the
modulation of attentional mechanisms.
An additional interesting observation was that responses that
had been associated with reward during acquisition were unaf-
fected by prime compatibility in the test phase. Considering that
reward-predictive stimuli have not only been shown to increase
attention but also to strengthen the associated response pathways
(e.g., Krebs et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012), it is feasible to assume
that former reward-associated responses in the current study are
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less prone to interfering information, namely incompatible effect
primes.
Another noteworthy finding in the present study was the
absence of significant compatibility effects with reward-unrelated
primes. This non-finding is rather surprising since binding for
unrewarded effects has already been demonstrated frequently in
the literature (e.g., Hommel et al., 2003 or Hoffmann et al., 2009).
However, the absence of compatibility effects for reward-unrelated
primes may be associated with methodological aspects of the
present experimental design. First, our study employed visual
action-effects, which have been shown to be less salient than
auditory action-effects, thereby leading to weaker A-E binding
(Kunde, 2001; Dutzi and Hommel, 2009). Moreover, the paradigm
was designed to minimize the influence of possibly confounding
factors that could artificially inflate the size of induction effects.
For instance, we excluded an influence of cue-effect associations
by introducing a novel set of pictures as cues in the test phase.
Furthermore, the present study employed a full combination of
primes and responses, i.e., each effect occurred multiple times both
as compatible and as incompatible prime. By using this design,
the influence of each particular effect is necessarily weakened in
comparison with classical paradigms that present effect stimuli
as either only compatible or only incompatible primes in the
test phase (cf. Elsner and Hommel, 2004; Wolfensteller and Ruge,
2011). A final paradigmatic aspect relates to the timing of prime
presentation relative to the onset of the response cues. Recently,
Ziessler and Nattkemper (2011) employed a systematic manip-
ulation of the stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) between effect
primes and response cues. Effects of prime compatibility were only
observed when the primes were presented after cue onset. Thus,
the absence of priming effects for reward-unrelated effects in the
present study could be partly due to the fact that the primes may
not have been presented at the time of their maximal effectiveness.
From a more general perspective, it is moreover a common
observation that the introduction of reward signals not only mod-
ulates performance in those trials that are subject to actual reward,
but it also modifies the general task context, resulting in altered
performance on the no-reward trials, as compared to a “neutral”
task-contexts without reward (e.g., Braem et al., 2012). Thus, in the
present study, the presence of reward in the acquisition phase may
have influenced participants’ experience of the unrewarded A-E
mappings as well. It could be argued that unrewarded effects in a
reward context may be perceived as less significant. Specifically, it
has been demonstrated that behavioral and neural influences of
high-reward vs. low-reward stimuli critically depend on the over-
all context, i.e., the differences between trial types become more
distinct in a general reward context (Delgado et al., 2004). Such a
relative “devaluation” of unrewarded effects may counteract A-E
binding in the present paradigm, such that for an action which
does not produce an explicitly positive outcome, a bi-directional
binding of the two events might be attenuated. Future research
could explore this question by explicitly introducing reward as well
and punishment signals during the acquisition of A-E associations.
Future research should also specify the precise mechanisms by
which reward enhances the association strength of motor repre-
sentations and representations of the respective sensory outcomes.
It is known from numerous studies employing reward-modulated
paradigms that reward associations can influence cognitive func-
tions and behavior via diverse mechanisms (Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa
and Engelmann, 2010). Among them are the prioritization of
perceptual processing and the enforcement of specific response
tendencies, as well as the increase of cognitive and physical effort
to perform the task and the change of long-term stimulus rep-
resentations. While conclusive statements about the underlying
mechanism may not be warranted based on the present data, it
appears likely that reward modulates the behavioral relevance of
both an action and its consequence, which may in turn enforce the
joint coding of the two events.
With regard to the neural level, dopamine has been proposed
to underlie the formation of sensorimotor associations (Colzato
et al., 2007a). Considering that reward-predicting stimuli are
known to trigger dopaminergic activity (Knutson and Gibbs, 2007;
Schott et al., 2008), it is likely that the reward-related effect in
our own study is mediated by dopamine as well. Future stud-
ies will be needed to illuminate this relationship further, e.g., by
assessing markers of individual dopamine levels, such as the spon-
taneous eye-blink rate, as covariates (Colzato et al., 2007b; Aarts
et al., 2012), or by employing a similar paradigm in individuals
with specific genotypes or clinical conditions promoting differen-
tial striatal dopamine levels (Schott et al., 2007; Yacubian et al.,
2007).
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